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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238.
CONSTITUTONAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW - PROVINCIAL OFFENCES OF
CARELESS DRIVING.
In this, the most recent of a long line of cases, the Supreme
Court of Canada has unanimously upheld the validity of the pro-
vincfal "careless driving" sections-in particular, s. 60 of the Ontario
Highway Traffic Act.1 The case arose upon the conviction of the
appellant Mann on a charge of careless driving under s. 60. The
magistrate thereupon submitted to the Supreme Court of Ontario
for adjudication the questions whether he had erred in law in
finding that:
(a) s. 60 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act was not ultra vires.
(b) there was no conflict between s. 60 and the dangerous
driving section2 of the Criminal Code.
Haines, J. in a thorough and exhaustive judgment was of the
opinion that s. 60 was valid provincial legislation but that it came
into conflict with s. 221(4) rendering s. 60 inoperative. He therefore
quashed the conviction.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, in a judgment delivered by Porter
C.J.O., for a unanimous court, held that both of the magistrate's
questions should be answered in the negative and that the conviction
should be restored. The Supreme Court of Canada, as aforementioned,
concurred with this result and held s. 60 to be intra vires. In its
judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada deals with three interrelated
problems which are couched in constitutional and criminal law. How-
ever, the court has glossed over many of the issues inherent in these
problems and has ignored completely the practical consequences of
their decision.
As was pointed out in Russell v. The Queen3 the first question
that must be determined is whether the Act in question (s. 60) falls
within any of the enumerated classes of subjects in s. 92 of the B.N.A.
Act; that is, does it have a provincial aspect?
In construing the careless driving section, the Court was unani-
mous in holding that s. 60 has a provincial aspect, namely the care
1 R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 60 "Every person is guilty of the offence of driving
carelessly who drives a vehicle on a highway without due care and attention
or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway and
is liable to a fine of not less than $10 and not more than $500 or to imprison-
ment for a term of not more than 3 months and in addition may have his
licence or permit suspended for a period of not more than 2 years."2 Section 221(4) of The Criminal Code reads "Everyone who drives a
motor vehicle on a street, road, highway, or other public place in a manner
that is dangerous to the public, having regard to the circumstances including
the nature, condition and use of such place and the amount of traffic that at
the time is, or might reasonably be expected to be on such place, is guilty of:(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for 2 years.(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction."
3 (1882), 7 A.C. 829, 830.
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and control of highways. The court in the Mann decision spends
almost no time in discussing this question relying totally on O'Grady
v. Sparling4 as determining the point. Although it is beyond dispute
that this law is settled in a cement-like finality, one wonders whether
the decision is nearly so solid in its validity or in its logic. As
Professor Laskin (as he then was) wrote, "[indeed the dissents of
Roach and Schroeder, JJ.A., in the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Yolies5 and the matching dissents of Cartwright and Lock, J.J. in
the O'Grady case show how close the provincial legislation came
to encroachment on the federal criminal law power". 6
In finding that s. 55(1) (the careless driving section) of the
Manitoba Highway Traffic Act had a provincial aspect, Judson, J.,
in O'Grady v. Sparling, wrote that "the power of the provincial legis-
lature to enact legislation for the regulation of highway traffic is
undoubted",7 and he cites the case of Provincial Secretary of the
Province of P.E.L v. Egan.8 He concludes from this case that s.
55(1) of the Manitoba Act is an integral part of the regulation of
highways.
One must, with respect, question Judson J.'s use of the Egan
decision to provide a provincial aspect for s. 55(1) of the Manitoba
Act. In the Egan case, the Court went out of its way to emphasize
that the impunged legislation, by which the province could revoke a
person's driving license on a conviction based on s. 285(4) of the
Criminal Code, did not in itself create an offence. Rinfret, J. stated
"It does not create an offence, it does not add to or vary the punish-
ment already declared by the Criminal Code, . . . it deals purely
and simply with certain civil rights in the Province of Prince Edward
Island, . . . it is licensing legislation confined to the territory of
Prince Edward Island".9 It is questionable whether the careless driv-
ing section attacked in O'Grady which explicitly creates an offence,
can be justified on an unrelated licensing provision.
In examining the Ontario Highway Traffic Act one will readily
see that the provisions include registration, licenses, driver tests,
garage licenses, automobile equipment, rates of speed, rules of the
road, owners liability, and the unsatisfied judgment fund. For the
breach of any of those sections a separate penalty is attached. It
would appear that s. 60, the careless driving section differs radically
in substance from the rest of the Act. It creates a separate offence
in itself.10 Cartwright, J. (dissenting) in O'Grady v. Sparling states
"In my opinion while the types of negligence dealt with differ ...
each seeks to repress in the public interest and with penal conse-
4 [1960] S.C.R. 804.
5 Regina v. Yofles, [1959] O.R. 206 (C.A.).
6 Laskin, Occupying the Field; Paramountcy in Penal Legislation, (1963),
41 CAN. BAR REV. 234, 250.
7 O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960) S.C.R. 804, 810.
8 ProvinciaZ Secretary of P.E.L v. Egan, [1941] S.C.R. 396.
9 Ibid., at 414.10 See Regina v. Yolles (C.A.), Supra, footnote 5, Roach J.A. dissenting
at 234.
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quences negligence in the operation of vehicles; each belongs to the
subject of public wrongs rather than to that of civil rights. Each
makes negligence a crime."'" It is particularly interesting to read
this judgment now, in the light of Cartwright, J.'s decision in the
Mann case. One must unhappily conclude that he too succumbed to
the onslaught of what might best be called the "social justification"
approach employed by the majority.
McRuer, C.J.H.C. in Regina v. Yolles 12 adopts another forceful
approach by submitting that the provinces were simply attempting
to revive the old common law offence of causing death by negligence.
He suggests the provinces have merely extended this by applying it
to negligent driving whether or not death ensues. Porter, C.J.O. on
appeal, dismisses this argument all to lightly.13
The final argument used both by Cartwright, J. in the O'Grady
decision and by McRuer, C.J.H.C. in the Yo~les case on this issue, is
that by enacting s. 60 the provinces are in effect trying to fill the
gaps left by Parliament in this field. Later, this note will examine
the history of this legislation in an attempt to point up the constant
anxiety of the provinces to protect the public from the bad driver.
Cartwright, J. and McRuer, C.J.H.C. 14 contend that this section, which
is quite different from the other provisions of the act, expressly
violates Lord Maugham's conclusion that "legislation coming in pith
and substance within one of the classes specifically enumerated in
s. 91, is beyond the competence of the provincial legislatures under
s. 92. In such a case it is immaterial whether the Dominion has or
has not dealt with the subject by legislation".' 5 Thus, as Cartwright,
J. writes in O'Grady v. Sparling,
"It is not within the power of the provincial legislature to remedy what
it regards as unwise omissions in the criminal law as enacted by
Parliament.... It appears to me to be self.evident that the exclusive
legislative authority in relation to criminal law given to Parliament by
s. 91(27) must include the power to decide what conduct shall not be
punishable as a crime against the state."16
It must be regretted that Cartwright, J., who once thought these
facts were so self-evident, should reject them so meekly, only six
years later.
However, the courts are so firm in asserting that s. 60 has a
provincial aspect that lengthy discussion of this question would be
futile. It is sufficient for the purpose of this note to raise some doubts
as to the validity and logic of this 'settled law'.
Assuming therefore that s. 60 has a valid provincial aspect one
must now scrutinize the matter on which Parliament has legislated in
order to define exactly what conduct Parliament has made a crime
by s. 221 (4). Presumably if the two pieces of legislation in fact cover
11 O'Grady v. Spar7ing, Supra, footnote 7, at 818.
12 Regina v. YoZ~es, [19581 O.R. 786, 803-807 (trial).
13 Regina v. Yolles (C.A.), Supra, footnote 5, 217.
14 Regina v. YoZ~es (trial), Supra, footnote 12, 802.
15 A.G. for AZta. v. A.G. for Canada, [19431 A.C. 356, 370.
16 O'Grady v. SparZing, Supra, footnote 7, 821.
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the same matter, the Dominion legislation must prevail. The Supreme
Court of Canada, after examining the two offences in Mann con-
cludes that in enacting s. 221(4), the federal Government has not
legislated on the same matter as the provincial Government has in
s. 60. The court is of the opinion that s. 221(4) does not make
inadvertent negligence a crime and although the two offences might
possibly overlap, they are definitely not repugnant.
One should analyse the judgment of Haines, J. at trial very
closely-something the Supreme Court failed to do. After admitting
that s. 60 makes no express reference to the creation of an element
of danger, Haines, J. writes:
"However the use of the words 'due care and attention ... and reasonable
consideration . . .' clearly contemplate a manner of driving that is
dangerous to the public or that is so similar as to be indistinguishable
for practicaZ purposes from the manner of driving prescribed by the
corresponding section of the Criminal Code. In comparing these sections,
the function of the court is not to examine each under a microscope in
order to discern what minute differences exist between them. Rather
the test is whether, despite their differences in details, the sections are
identical in general substance. .. ,17
Although in the recent case of Regina v. Binus,18 Laskin, J.A. has
purported to follow the decision of Mann, at one point in his judg-
ment he writes "the difference in the two offences lies not in the
standard of conduct which each involves". 19 This seems to be in
complete accord with the conclusion of Haines, J. in the Mann
decision when he writes, "Applying this criterion it is my view that
the sections cover substantially the same area and penalize the same
conduct". 20 Although the Supreme Court has decided different stand-
ards of conduct are established, and that dangerous driving is more
than mere inadvertence; they give no concrete examples of this
difference.
Spence, J., in Mann, writes, "[iun my view, however.., danger
was not a necessary ingredient of the offence charged under s. 60."21
One would be more convinced if he were shown a case that involved
careless driving but did not involve danger. Spence, J. continued
and suggested there might be cases of inconvience or obstruction
resulting from conduct which fell within s. 60 but was not dangerous.
He gives no practical example of these situations. Laskin, J.A. in
the Binus decision tries to elucidate the problem by giving the example
of a man driving down the centre line of a highway and not allowing
other cars to pass. With respect, it would appear that this situation
is fraught with danger.
To those who would suggest that there are different degrees of
negligence applicable to each offence they should turn their attention
to the statement of McRuer C.J.H.C. in R. v. Seabrook22 where he
17 Regina . Mann (1965), 48 D.L.R. (2d) 481, 484 (trial).18 Regina v. Binus, [19662 2 O.R. 324.19 Ibid., at 334.
20 Regina v. Mann (trial), Supra, footnote 17, 484.
21 Mann v. The Queen, [1966 S.C.R. 238, 252.
22 (1952), 103 C.C.C. 7, 11.
19671
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
asserted, "In applying s. 285(6) [the forerunner of the present s. 221
(4) ] to certain proven facts, I can see no justification for becoming
involved in a consideration of the law of civil negligence or degrees
of negligence".
Having decided that each offence has the same actus reus,
Haines J. passes on to look at the mens rea required by each offence.
None of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada came to grips
with this argument with the possible exception of Cartwright J. who
gives the most intensive judgment of the court. Perhaps because of
his dissent in O'Grady v. Sparling he has more motivation than the
others to justify his conclusion in this case. He adopted the reasoning
of Coffin J. in Regina v. Jeffers23 in his conclusion that s. 221(4)
has mens rea as a constituent element of the offence. Haines J.,
however, examines this area in more detail. After referring to
Glanville Williams,2 4 he concludes: "The only two states of mind that
constitute mens rea are intention and recklessness the latter being
synonymous with advertent negligence". In analysing s. 221(4)
Haines J. continues,2 5 "[tihis kind of culpability is negligence. It is
distinguishable from acting intentionally or recklessly in that it does
not involve a state of awareness. It is the case where the actor
inadvertently creates a risk of which he ought to be aware". 26 Haines
J. accepts the O'-rady decision 7 as authority that mens rea is not
required in order to convict one of careless driving and with respect
to dangerous driving the same result is reached by Pottier, J., at trial
in R. v. Jeffers.28 When R. v. Jeffers went on appeal to the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court, the court was split on this issue. Cartwright J.,
as aforementioned, adopted the view of Coffin J. (Patterson J. concur-
ring), but does not even mention the opinion of Currie J., (Bissett J.
concurring), who agreed with Pottier, J. at trial, that mens rea is not
a requisite element of the offence of dangerous driving. In the light
of this background, Cartwright J.'s use of Coffin J.'s judgment in
Regina v. Jeffers as a support for his conclusion seems very shaky
indeed.
In his finding that mens rea is an element of dangerous driving,
Cartwright, J. uses as a second support (after the Jeffers decision),
the interpretation of Casey, J. in Loiselle v. The Queen29 of s. 285 (6),
the forerunner of the present dangerous driving section. This second
foundation is even more fragile than the first in the light of R. V.
White,30 a more recent case which Cartwright, J. omits completely.
In this case, Higgins, J. of the Newfoundland Supreme Court reviewed
23 (1965), 45 C.R. 177.
24 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law (Second Edition), 31 and 53.
25 Regina v. Mann (trial), supra, footnote 17, at 487.
26 rbid., at 488.
27 O'Grady v. Sparling, Supra, footnote 7, at 810.
28 Note, (1963), 7 Crim. L.Q. 243.
29 (1954), 109 C.C.C. 31 at 38; Casey J. states "Both acts envisaged by s.
285(6) imply something more than mere inadvertence or mere thoughtlessness
or mere negligence, or mere error in judgment."30 [1965] C.C.C. 147, 150.
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the case law on s. 285 (6) noting especially the Loiselle decision and
stated:
"I have considered the cases, and I must say that all are authority for the
proposition that mens rea was a necessary ingredient in a charge of
dangerous driving at the time when these cases were tried. That is no
longer the law. The provision of s. 221 (4) in the legislation of 1961indicates that it was not intended to legislate for offences included in
criminal negligence but that a new offence was created; an offence which
may be described as inadvertent negligence in which mens rea is not
required."
Nor is any mention made in the Supreme Court of R. v. Latimer31
where the court came to a similar conclusion. Even Laskin J.A. in
the Binus case accepts the conclusion that no mens rea is required to
convict under s. 221 (4). After stating that the very language of
s. 221 (4) precludes mens rea as an ingredient of that offence and
that the difference between s. 221 (4) and s. 60 lies not in the conduct
but rather the consequences involved, he says "the negligence which
will support a tort action if damage results may equally support con-
victions of a Provincial or Federal driving offence or both".3 2 In the
face of this unanswered authority the decision in Mann v. The Queen
is simply inadequate. After deciding the actus reus of each offence is
similar and no mens rea is required in either, Haines, J. has little
trouble in concluding the two offences are in conflict.
There is certainly enough authority to consider the law is now
settled in holding that recklessness is advertent negligence.3 3 If one
examines the old section of dangerous driving (s. 285 (6)) and com-
pares it to the new s. 221 (4) it will be seen that the two are identical
with the exception that in s. 221 (4), the word "recklessly" is omitted.
If "reckless" is synonymous with "advertent negligence" this would
suggest that what remains is inadvertent negligence, the very conduct
O'Grady v. Sparling said was covered by s. 60.34
With this thought in mind, it is very revealing to look at the
history of this dangerous driving section. McRuer C.J.H.C. in Regina
V. Yolles sets out the history in a complete manner. He writes:
"In 1906 the provincial legislature did what Parliament was unwilling to
do and created the offence of driving recklessly or negligently in a manner
dangerous to the public. However, in 1938, the Parliament of Canada
apparently recognized this legislative field as one of criminal law and
incorporated the provincial legislation in s. 285 (6). In 1939 the provinces
again amplified the federal legislation by enacting the careless driving
section. Finally in 1.955 Parliament expressly dealt with the subject of
negligence in the operation of motor vehicles by enacting s. 191 (1) and
s. 221 (1)."35
31 (1963), 43 C.R. 328.
32 Regina v. Binus, supra, footnote 18, at 235. See also R. v. Evans (1962),
47 Crim. App. Rev. 62, 64, 65, and also the Special Lectures of the Law Society
of Upper Canada, 1966, 331-332, where a new shift in criminal law is noticed in
the apparent weakening of mens rea as a requisite element of several offences.
33 S. C. Desch, Negligent Murder, (1963), 26 MOD. L.R. 660; see also
Supra, footnote 24 at 53; and Supra, footnote 17 at 487.
34 O'Grady v. Sparling, supra, footnote 7, at 810.
35 Regina v. Yolles (trial), Supra, footnote 12, at 802-803.
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In the case of O'Grady v. Sparling the Supreme Court said this
section dealt with advertent negligence and not inadvertent negli-
gence, though the latter, the Court suggests, was within the Federal
Criminal Law power.3 6 Less than twelve months later, in 1961, Parlia-
ment again, as in 1938, took cognizance of this legislative opportunity,
presented by Judson, J., in O'Grady, and re-enacted the dangerous
driving section but this time omitting the word "recklessly" (i.e.
"advertent negligence"). Surely this is not mere coincidence. With
respect, it does not require much imagination to realize what kind of
conduct s. 221 (4) was aimed at. It is little wonder the Supreme Court
glossed over or completely omitted these considerations.
Having decided that s. 60 has a valid provincial aspect and that
s. 221 (4) covers a different subject matter than s. 60, this would seem
sufficient to uphold the provincial careless driving section and answer,
in the negative, the final question of whether these sections are so
similar as to be conflicting.
Although the judges spend very little time on this third question,
and almost all of their efforts are spent drawing distinctions between
the two offences, it is very revealing to analyse the courts', (especially
Fauteux J.'s), reasoning on this issue of conflicting legislation and
their interpretation of the "paramountcy" doctrine. At the outset it
must be emphasized the B.N.A. Act does not expressly provide for a
doctrine of paramountcy.3 7 However, in the past the courts have
recognized such a principle as inherent in the B.N.A. Act which gives
to the Federal legislation the stamp of supremacy.38
The majority of the court in Mann v. The Queen dealt with this
issue summarily, again basing its decision on the case of O'Grady v.
Sparling. In this case, Judson, J. wrote, "a prior enactment does not
become a matter of criminal law merely because it consists of a prohi-
bition and makes it an offence for failure to observe the prohibition".3 9
After deciding that the Manitoba careless driving section did have
a provincial aspect (the control of automobiles on the highways)
Judson, J. stated that "even though there may be some overlapping
in a particular case between the two enactments, this did not con-
stitute repugnancy and did not mean the Provincial enactment was
inoperative". 40 He claims that the two provisions deal with different
subject matters, and were enacted for different purposes and con-
36 O'Grady v. SparZing, supra, footnote 7, per Judson J. at 809 "Inadver-
tent negligence is dealt with under the provincial legislation in relation to the
regulation of highway traffic. That is its true character and until Parliament
chooses to define it in the Criminal Code as a crime, it is not a crime."
37 With the exception of the concurrent fields of agriculture and immigra-
tion, S. 95 of the B.N.A. Act, (1867), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
38 See A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can., [18961 A.C. 348, 366 where Lord Watson
stated "It may now be settled law that ... the enactments of the Parliament
of Canada, in so far as there are within its competency, must override provin.
cial legislation." See also Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. A.G. Can.,[1907] A.C. 65, 67-68.
39 O'Grady v. SparZing, Supra, footnote 7, at 811; See also Quong-Wing
v. The King, (1914) 49 S.C.R. 440.
40 Ibid., O'Grady 'v. Sparling.
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cludes, therefore, that "[b] oth enactments can live together and oper-
ate concurrently". 41
It would seem that Judson, J. in talking in terms of conflict and
repugnancy is leaning towards the reasoning of Lord Watson in the
Local Prohibition Case where he states: "The repeal of a provincial
statute by the Parliament of Canada can only be affected by repug-
nancy between its provisions and the enactments of the Dominion". 42
The court in O'Grady v. Sparling is thus implicitly rejecting the test
of Lord Dunedin in Grand Trunk Railroad of Canada v. A.G. Canada.43
Indeed Mr. Justice Laskin in a pre-judicial utterance, succinctly points
out that Judson, J.'s reasoning "excludes application of paramountcy
in cases where provincial legislation is challenged on the basis of
measuring penal enactments in provincial regulatory statutes against
blunt prohibitions in the Criminal Code".44
As aforementioned, the majority of the judges in the Mann case
accept in toto the reasoning of Judson, J. in O'Grady v. Sparling.
After deciding at some length Parliament has not defined "inadvertent
negligence" as a crime, Cartwright, J. tersely concludes . . . "I find
the present case indistinguishable from O'Grady v. Sparling and would
dismiss the appeal".45 Ritchie J. also feels the two sections deal with
different subject matters and for different purposes and "that this
case is therefore governed by the decision of this court in O'Grady v.
Sparling".46
It would seem then that the majority of the judges, in the Mann
decision, have adopted Judson J.'s test in O'Grady v. Sparling of
focussing on the object and purpose of the legislation, in this area,
where the provincial penal statute is attacked as encroaching on the
Federal Criminal Law power, in order to circumscribe the para-
mountcy principle.
That this "object and purpose" approach is merely a "social
policy" test or a judicial scheme to circumvent the paramountcy
doctrine is borne out very crudely in the earlier decision of Reference
Re sect. 92 (4) of the Vehicles Act, 1957 (Sask.) c. 93.47 Here the
Supreme Court held intra vires a provincial enactment which coerced
a person to take a breathalizer test on the threat of the loss of his
driver's license for 90 days notwithstanding s. 224 (4) of the Criminal
Code, which expressly allowed a person to refuse such a test. From
this decision it becomes very obvious that by employing this social
justification test, the court requires little imagination to be able to
41 Ibid.
42 A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can., supra, footnote 38, at 366.
43 Where at 67, 68, Dunedin C.J. stated: "First ... there can be a domain
in which Provincial and Dominion legislation may overlap in which case
neither legislation will be ultra vires if the field is clear; and secondly that if
the field is not clear and in such a domain [if] the two legislations meet, the
Dominion legislation must prevail."
44 Supra, footnote 6, at 237.
45 Mann v. Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238 at 247.
46 Ibid., at 251.
47 [1958] S.C.R. 808.
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find a provincial "object or purpose" for almost any provision, thus
avoiding the paramountcy doctrine.48
This reasoning certainly is discouraging to the Federalists. How-
ever, the majority of the court (Cartwright, Martland, Ritchie and
Spence J.J.) in the Mann case do not seem satisfied merely to adopt
Judson J.'s reasoning in O'Grady v. Sparling in this aspect of the case
and they still feel it necessary to spend most of their time pointing up
minor distinctions and differences in the two offences and concluding
Parliament still has not defined inadvertent negligence as a crime.
They do not, in short, seem to be denying the existence of a para-
mountcy doctrine.
However, as a result of the judgment of Fauteux, J. (with whom
Judson and Abbott J.J. concurred), the paramountcy doctrine may
even be denied the benefit of being ignored. It would seem that
Fauteux, J. is going to some extremes in his judgment and implicitly
inferring the distinctions drawn by the other judges between the two
offences are irrelevant. He makes no factual distinctions between the
two offences whatsoever and concentrates his efforts in asserting s. 60
has a separate object and purpose, that "the two sections differ in
subject matter as well as to legislative purpose, and legal and practical
effect".49 After stating s. 60 is a valid provision in relation to the
regulation of highways he asserts that when there is a conflict between
the provincial regulatory power and the criminal law power of
Parliament, the latter could never be validly construed,
to a point leading to the gradual and eventual absorption or virtual ex-
tinction of the provincial regulatory power. Indeed, both these powers must
be rationalized in principle and reconciled in practice whenever possible.
I do not think that because the circumstances of a particular case may
bring it within the scope of both s. 221 (4) and s. 60, one may validly
conclude that s. 60 does not impose a duty to serve bona fide ends not
otherwise secured and in no way conflicting with s. 221 (4) ... I see no
obstacle in preventing both enactments living together and operating
concurrently.50
Fauteux, J. seems keenly aware that the criminal law power could
be used to usurp many otherwise valid provincial regulatory measures
if the paramountcy doctrine were to prevail, and he seems determined
to destroy this doctrine as well as any wide definition ever given the
criminal law power.51 Indeed the paramountcy doctrine as interpreted
by Martland, J. in Smith v. The Queen,5 2 once thought to be overly
restrictive and narrow, may no longer be in the extreme. The result
of this rationale of Fauteux J.'s judgment is that the paramountcy
48 For a complete analysis of judicial review in this area, see Lederman,
The Concurrent Operation of Federal & Provincial Laws in Canada, (1962.3)
9 McGiu.L L.J. 185.
49 Supra, footnote 45, at 250.
50 Ibid.
51 Certainly one must consider as at an end the wide definitions giving
supremacy to the criminal law lower in P.A.T.A. v. A.G. Can., [1931] A.C. 310
and A.G. B.C. v. A.G. Can., [1937] A.C. 368, 376.
52 [1960] S.C.R. 776, 800, where he wrote that "there is only conflict within
the meaning of paramountcy when compliance with one law involves breach
of the other."
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doctrine must be considered dead: for once one can discern two
aspects, one provincial and one federal, to support a given matter, by
Fauteux J.'s reasoning both pieces of legislation would be valid.
That this rationale has merit is unfortunately borne out by the
judicial interpretation of the Mann decision in a most recent judgment
of Laskin J.A., in Regina v. Binus where he writes: "I may add that
even if there were no difference, (between s. 60 and s. 221 (4)) that
would not, under the principles enunciated in O'Grady v. Sparling and
Mann v. The Queen, affect the constitutionality of the Provincial
enactment".5
3
Thus, as a result of adopting and extending a "social policy" test
of analysing the object and purpose of the legislation, even if Parlia-
ment has occupied the field, had made inadvertent negligence a crime,
or had even enacted s. 221 (4) in the very words of s. 60, it would
seem that the courts may still hold the provincial enactment valid.
Thus if Fauteux J.'s reasoning is to prevail on this point, the Mann
decision must stand for "the permissibility of two complementary
policies, one federal, one provincial, in the field of the protection of
members of the public from the bad driver".5 4
Apart from the criticism that Fauteux J.'s reasoning is seem-
ingly an unprecedented and unwarranted interpretation of the para-
mountcy doctrine, his judgment and the conclusion reached by the
other members of the court is open to a far more serious criticism-
namely, the practical consequences of such a decision.
As a result of this decision it may be that the bad driver faces
double liability and penalties for the same act. Both in the aforemen-
tioned article55 and in his text on Canadian constitutional law, Pro-
fessor Laskin (as he then was) expresses the view that "this makes
possible plural penal liability for the same act and it is questionable
whether it is good policy in a federal state to invite it".56 And again
in the same text, he writes: "Certainly there must be some compelling
reason to subject persons to double liability if both the Dominion and
Provincial legislation seek to meet the same social problem in the
identical way regardless of the differences of object or purpose in the
constitutional sense".5 7
This dual liability which the Mann decision encourages may be
attacked effectively from several different angles.5 8
53 Regina v. Binus, [1966] 2 O.R. 324 at 335.
54 Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 1966, (Third Edition) 140.
55 Supra, footnote 6, at 262.
56 Laskin, Supra, footnote 54, at 130.
57 Ibid., at 107.
58 Inherent in this issue of dual liability are two equally repulsive possi-
bilities. The first possibility is of coercing the accused to enter a plea of guilty
to the lesser offence by threatening to proceed with the more serious charge.
The second is the possibility of convicting him of both.
This note has only analyzed the first, but one must be equally aware of
the second. Although less frequently employed in practice by the Crown
[Footnote continued on next page]
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Firstly, it can leave (and has left) the law in a confused and
muddled state. It is one thing to say in theory that the two sections
are different but it is quite another to apply this distinction.59 Even
the courts have had difficulty in attempting to apply the Mann deci-
sion. Laskin J.A. in his judgment in the Binus decision at one point
concludes: "I do not however read the Mann case as providing a guide
to the ingredients of the offence of dangerous driving sufficient for
the purposes of the substantive criminal law as contrasted with the
purposes of constitutional demarcation of law-making power". 60 This
statement will do little to assist the practitioner in advising his client
as to the conduct covered by either offence. Laskin J.A. then proceeds
to find the difference in the two sections, as interpreted from the Mann
decision not in the standard of conduct but rather in "the prohibited
consequences themselves!"
As the editors of the CRIMINAL LAW QUARTERLY write, "[t] o the
general practitioner who cares little for rationalizations but who daily
faces practical situations in Magistrates' Courts there is now no prac-
tical difference between careless and dangerous driving. The court in
this case (Binus) in our respectful opinion is still trying vainly to
rationalize the irrational". 61 In an earlier article in the same volume
the editors state that "any differentiation in the type of negligence
supporting one or the other seems to have been lost, and if, in a federal
system of government, there is a failure to distinguish the two, one
must fall". 62
When the dual penalty is threatened and the courts and the prac-
titioners are unable to distinguish between the two types of conduct
which give rise to the penalties, two extremely inequitable results
occur.
Firstly as the CRIMINAL LAW QUARTERLY noted, there is no differ-
ence between the two offences. One exception is listed and described as
"Crown Attorney's choice", and the editors advise that, "counsel's best
course of action is to negotiate a plea of guilty of the lesser charge
Attorney, it is certainly not unknown. In the case of Regina v. Devries (County
Court in Ontario) (1964) 2 C.C.C. 203, Reville, J. found the accused guilty
under s. 225 (3) (d) of the Criminal Code (driving while disqualified) after
he had earlier entered a plea of guilty, on the identical set of facts, to s. 13(1) of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act (driving without holding an operator's
license). Reville, J. dismissed both the defences of res judicata and autrefois
convict. Although Laskin in his pronouncements on double jeopardy (Supra,
footnotes 55, 56, 57), would seem to suggest that under our federal system,
this is constitutionally valid, it is questionable whether this is so when viewed
in terms of substantive criminal law. It is debatable that Reville, J.'s Inter-
pretation of autrefois convict (that the accused is charged with the offence
and not the facts) is the correct one and it could still be forcibly argued that
a person cannot be convicted twice on the same set of facts. For a complete
discussion of this whole area of double convictions and autrefois convict In
our federal system, see the recent article by M. L. Friedland, Double Jeopardy
and the Division of Legislative Authority in Canada, (1967) 17 U. TORONTO
L.J. 66.
59 Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures 1966, at 332.60 Regina v. Binus, Supra, footnote 53, at 329.
61 Note, (1965-66) 8 Canv. L.Q. 341.
62 Note, (1965-66) 8 CRIM. L.Q. 4.
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with the threat of making a charge of dangerous driving last all day.
With today's busy calendars that is by far the best'weapon in the
defense arsenal". 63 At best this is a shoddy manner to dispose of the
accused's rights. In effect it amounts to a bribe, and coerces defendants
to plead guilty to the lesser charge to avoid the harsher penalty. Surely
this is not a desirable result and yet it is a result the Supreme Court
of Canada seems determined to have effected.
Even more disconcerting is the pertinent and valid conclusion of
Professor Hopper that:
depending as it does upon this discretion, the decision is more likely to
be taken by reference not to the accused's conduct, but to the consequences
of the conduct.... Assuming that the accused drove carelessly and as a
result injured someone, it will not be difficult to obtain a conviction for
dangerous driving. Yet, other drivers who do not injure anyone may well
have driven far more dangerously and be far more deserving of punish-
ment, but only be charged with and convicted of the lesser offence.64
This view of the difference between the two offences is in accord
with Laskin J.A.'s interpretation of the Mann decision in R. v. Binus.
Surely it is unfair to punish the accused more severely under the more
serious charge of s. 221 (4) because of extenuating circumstances over
which he had no control and which in no way reflect on his degree of
fault.
It seems the Supreme Court of Canada is determined to help the
provinces in their war against the bad driver and the alarmingly high
dead toll on the highways. With respect, it appears quite clear that
the court has affirmed this social justification approach with zeal and
enthusiasm in order to do their part to suppress this public enemy.
It is certainly an admirable thought and one should not perhaps be
too quick to criticize a progressive and modern thinking court. How-
ever, in adopting this social policy test it seems that they have not
considered the consequences of their decision, consequences which al-
though may aid in suppressing this evil, have created others just as
ugly and odius. One cannot overemphasize the totally precarious and
injurious position the accused is put into as a result of allowing both
enactments to stand.
We can all sympathize with the courts' attempt to sharply reduce
one of the nation's highest killers, but the means adopted in this case
to achieve that end not only could raise serious constitutional im-
balances but could coerce many defendants to enter pleas of guilty
to charges of careless driving that are at best questionable or else
penalize him for acts over which he had no control. Both are to be
violently opposed. A far more effective line for the courts to employ
to achieve their goal, would be to declare s. 60 superceded by s. 221 (4)
63 Supra, footnote 61. See also Glanville Williams, Supra, footnote 24, at
117. "The question whether the defendant is brought into court under the
major and minor charge depends merely on the discretion of the prosecutor
without governing rules."
64 Hopper, Dangerous Driving, A Controversial Decision, (1966) 9 Cnm .
L.Q. 37, at 41.
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